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RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER - INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE BURDEN OF PROOF: In the course of the majority opinion in Commonwealth
v. Chapman' two statements appear which are on their faces completely contradictory. It is the purpose of this note to indicate the extent of the apparent antinomy
and to suggest a method by which the phrases may be made less confusing in presentation to both legal and lay minds.
To an indictment for murder the defendant had pleaded guilty, raising the
defense of intoxication. Both the trial court, sitting without jury, and the Supreme
Court found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. The two statements pertinent to this discussion, both boasting a long line of judicial precedent, were:
1. THE BURDEN IS UPON THE COMMONWEALTH to establish the
essential element of the higher degree of crime-a specific intent to kill.
2. The appellant has not sustained THE BURDEN UPON HIM of establishing by a fairly preponderating evidence that his intoxication prevented him from
forming the requisite intent.
Similar conflicting words, used in instructing a jury in a case where "alibi"
was a defense, received harsh treatment from Chief Justice Maxey speaking in Commonwealth v. Barnak.2 Such instructions were called incongruous, "an anomaly
which trial judges would do better not to repeat", and it was stated that such instructions confuse both lawyers and juries.
Immediately the questions arise as to what the "burden" is and upon whom
it falls. The plea of guilty to an indictment for murder is only to the crime of second degree murder. If the Commonwealth desires to raise the degree of the crime,
the BURDEN is upon it to prove facts supplying the essential elements of first
degree murder including the specific intent to take life. 8 Initially and at every stage
of the trial the BURDEN, or risk of non-persuasion of the trier of fact is on the
Commonwealth. 4
In interposing the defense of intoxication the defendant asserts that his mind
was so clouded with liquor that he did not have the capacity to form a specific intent to take human life. By this defense he assumes the BURDEN of coming forward with evidence that the intent could not exist. This means simply that the defendant must satisfy the court that there is a sufficient quantity of evidence of intoxication to be considered by the judge. This BURDEN starts with the defendant
and remains until the judge has decided as a matter of law that it has been satisfied.$
1 359 Pa. 164, A. 2d (1948).

357 Pa. 391, 54 A. 2d 865 (1947).
8 Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 5(; A. 2d 317 (1947).
4 Commonwealth v. Tiffany, 121 Pa. 165, 15 A 462 (1888).
2
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At this point however the defendant is faced with the necessity of overcoming
a presumption of mental capacity which arises in criminal cases. 6 It would be impractical to compel the Commonwealth in all cases to show the existence of a mental
state which does not lend itself to proof by objective manifestations but is essentially
finally determinable only by subjective tests. It is incumbent upon the defendant to
show by fairly preponderating evidence that he was, because of intoxication, unable
to intend death with a full and conscious knowledge, although it is not necessary
that all doubt be removed. 7 This seems to be the extent of the BURDEN upon the
defendant.
However the Commonwealth retains the primary BURDEN without exception
or mitigating circumstance. It must show beyond a reasonabledoubt that the intent
in fact did exist and this involves producing evidence that the intoxication was not
sufficient to destroy the capacity to intend.8 This common law requirement has
found collateral statutory approval in Pennsylvania.9 Further it should be noted
that the deliberation necessary to form the intent to kill is the fact that must be
proved and not a deliberation upon the intent.
In the case two justices dissented but on a question of fact saying that the evidence of drunkenness was so fairly preponderating as to negative the formation of
a specific intent to kill. Later upon the unanimous recommendation of the Pardons
Board and "- -in view of the strong dissent" the Governor of the Commonwealth
commuted the defendant's sentence to life imprisonment."1
In instructing a jury the mentioning of the word "BURDENS" should be and
can be avoided. 12 The jury's attention should be called to the fact that intoxication
does not excuse the crime and that not all drunkenness will succeed in preventing
the crime from becoming that of murder of the first degree, but that the jury must
determine whether the intoxication deprived the defendant of the power of judging
his acts and their legitimate consequences."8 After instructing the jury as to the
duty of the prosecution, the part of the defendant can be shown substantially as
follows: If the defendant has shown by fairly preponderating evidence that his intoxication prevented him from having a present capacity to intend death then that
evidence must cast a reasonable doubt as to the Commonwealth's proof of intent
and the defendant must be acquitted of murder in the first degree.
Robert G. Crist
5 Commonwealth v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463, 31 A 202 (1896); IX WIGMORE EVIDENCE
284 (3rd ed. 1940).
6 Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A 878 (1920).
'7 Commonwealth v. Daley, 2 Clark 361 (Pa. 1844).
s Commonwealth v. Turner, 86 Pa. at 74 (1878).
9 Act of February -15. 1870, PL 15, 19 PS 1187.
10 Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862).
11 HARRISBURG EVENING NEWS, July 3. 1948.
12 Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 476, 39 A. 2d 572 (1944).
1IsCommonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A 1017; Commonwealth v. Crozier, I Brews. 349
(Pa. 1867).
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DIVORCE DECREES ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: Some of
the confusion regarding the status of migratory divorces has been cleared by the
Supreme Court decision in Sherrer v. Sherrer, decided June 7, 1948,-U.S.-, 68
S.C.T. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1055.
Chief Justice Vinson, in the majority opinion, held that the courts of Cne state
cannot overturn the divorce of another state when both the husband and the wife
appeared before the divorce judge. This is a move toward settlement of the confused status of persons who rely upon a migratory divorce decree. The constitutional
provision that each state shall give full faith and credit to the decisions of the sister
state is given as the reason for the court's decision.
The facts of the case were that the wife went to Florida, ostensibly for a vacation, (the domicile of the couple being in Massachusetts), but she remained in
Florida and eventually sued her husband for divorce there. The husband appeared
to question the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the libellant was not a
resident of Florida. The court decided that she satisfied the Florida residence requirements and therefore that they had jurisdiction. The Florida court proceeded
to grant the wife a divorce.
An attempted redetermination of this decision by the Massachusetts court, at
the instance of the husband, was held void by the Supreme Court as a denial of
full faith and credit to which the Florida decree was entitled.
In the language of the opinion, "In refusing to recognize the validity of that
decree (Florida divorce decree), the Massachusetts courts have asserted a power
which cannot be reconciled with the requirements of due faith and credit." Full
faith and credit must be given to divorce decrees rendered in contested cases by
courts in sister states no less than to other decrees.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter (who was joined by Justice
Murphy) stated that although the majority decision could result in greater certainty
as to the status of divorced persons, it may also result in reducing divorce standards
of all the states to that of the few states who make an industry of granting "quickie"
divorces.
He reminds the court of difficulties inherent in the Federal system whereby
governmental power over domestic relations is not given to the central government.
He would lend strength to the contention that the states should have the power
to regulate the domestic problems of its citizens.
In his language-"The real question here is whether the full faith and credit
clause can be used as a limitation on the power of a state over its citizens who do
not change their domicile, who do not remove to another state, but who leave the
state only long enough to escape the rigors of its laws, obtain a divorce, and then
scurry back."
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Frankfurter believes that the number of persons who obtain such divorces is
relatively small (less than 6% of all U.S. divorces in 1940 were granted in the major
divorce mills of Florida and Nevada), and he therefore asks - "is their security
so important to the nation that we must safeguard it even at the price of depriving
the great majority of states which do not offer bargain-counter divorces of the
right to determine the laws of domestic relations applicable to their citizens?" The
dissent is of the opinion that the tangled problem cannot be solved by the judiciary
but that it can only be done by constitutional amendment or congressional action.
Here, it would seem, is the crux of the disagreement. Law-abiding citizens,
who in good faith remarry on the strength of a foreign divorce decree, may be involved in civil or even criminal litigation, if the decree is declared invalid. The
majority opinion is an attempt by the court to alleviate this situation. The dissent
would leave it to the law-makers to correct.
In absence of uniform laws, throughout the land and with the apparent reluctance of our law makers to formulate such a uniform code, can the U. S. Supreme
Court be deemed officious in attempting to prevent such interstate dissension? It
seems to the writer that such a charge could scarcely be made, and although a vigorous dissent has been recorded in the case under discussion, the need for such a
decision as in Sherrer v. Sherrer was obvious.
The legal profession and interested principals can see daylight through the
tangled confusion of contrary divorce decisions, and attorneys can advise their
clients, upon the authority of the Supreme Court, that, provided the husband and
wife submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction,a divorce decree handed down by the
forum will be entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of other states.
This single decision cannot cope with the enormity of the problem and so long
as the divorce requirements amongst our states vary, confusion and doubt will remain. The lawmakers should heed the warnings of Justice Frankfurter, lest the
divorce standards of all the states be lowered to the dubious requirements of Florida,
Nevada, Wyoming, Arkansas and Idaho. The court has done its share toward resolving the stigma surrounding divorce decrees of foreign states.
As has occurred before in its history, the judiciary has shown the way for the
legislative branch. The need for uniform divorce legislation is great. Perhaps the
decision recorded in Sherrer v. SbIerrer will provide.the necessary impetus for it.
Perrin C. Hamilton
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PRACTICE - NO APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE WHOLE RECORD AFTER JURY DISAGREEMENT - ACT
OF 1911: Pennsylvania's Act of April 20, 1911, P. L. 70, 12 P. S. 684, provides that
whenever upon the trial of any issue a point requesting binding instructions has
been reserved or declined, and the jury have disagreed, the party who presented
the point may move the court to have the evidence taken on the trial certified and
filed so as to become part of the record, and for judgment in his favor upon the
whole record. The trial court is then under a duty, unless it shall be of the opinion
that the case should be retried, to so certify the evidence and to enter such judgment, if any, as should have been entered upon the evidence at the time of the trial.
"From the judgment thus entered the party against whom it is entered may appeal
to the Supreme or Superior Court, as in other cases, which shall review the action
of the court below, and enter such judgment, if any, as should have been entered
by the court below upon the evidence." The act makes no reference to appeals
other than in the sentence just quoted.
The Act of 1911 has given rise to a number of conflicting decisions on whether
a party who moves for judgment on the whole record under the authority of this
act has a right to appeal where the court is of the opinion that the case should be
retried, and consequently dismisses the motion rather than enter a judgment in
favor of either party. This conflict has been resolved by the recent case of De Waele
v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Company, 358 Pa. 574, 58 A. 2d 34, (1948) which
holds that there is no right of appeal from the refusal of the court to enter judgment
on the whole recordunder the Act of 1911. The opinion, written by Justice Jones,
reviews all of the cases since 1911 in- which appeals have been taken from refusals
to enter judgment on the whole record after disagreement of the jury. The decision
overrules the case of Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350 (1936), and a line
of decisions beginning with Phillips v. American Stores Company, 342 Pa. 33 20
A. 2d 190 (1941). The Court relies on the early case of Lipsky v. Stolzer, 236 Pa.
151 (1912) 84 A. 688, as authority for its conclusion.
The De Waele decision reiterates the holding of the Lipsky case, that the Act
of 1911 authorizes an appeal only from the "judgment thus far entered" and that
an order dismissing a motion for judgment on the whole record is not itself a "judgment" within the meaning of the statute. That the Lipsky decision was correct the
court infers from the fact that in 1925 the Pennsylvania legislature amended the
"Judgment N.O.V. Act" (Act of April 22, 1905, P. L. 286, 12 P. S. 681; amended
by Act of April 9, 1925, P. L. 221, 12 P. S. 681, 682), which is closely related to
the Act of 1911, without making any change in the latter act. The case of Conley
v. Mervis, cit. supra, held that an appeal could be taken from the lower court's refusal to enter judgment on the whole record if there was no conflicting evidence
necessitating the determination of a question of fact by the jury. The De Waele
decision points out that the right of appeal cannot be made to depend upon the
extent or character of relief affordable under the particular facts of the case but
must depend upon the power of the appellate court to enter into the inquiry in the
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first place. The decisions led by the case of Phillips v. American Stores Company,
cit. supra, treated the appeal from the dismissal of a motion to enter judgment on
the whole record, at least where the dismissal of the motion was accompanied by
an order for new trial, as an appeal from the award of a new trial, which is permissible under some circumstances at common law. The De Waele decision repudiates this theory. The court notes that an appeal from an order for new trial is a review for palpable abuse of discretion or plain error of controlling law in the granting of the new trial. Where the jury have disagreed, a new trial ensues without a
grant thereof by the court. The court reasons that there can be no review of judicial'
discretion where none has been exercised and where judicial action would have
been vain, so that it is unrealistic to treat the appeal as one for review of an award
of a new trial.
It is regrettable that the rule of the Lipsky case was ever allowed to be qualified,
because of the uncertainty which developed. In the eleven years since the decision
of Conley v. Mervis modified the rule of Lipsky v. Stolzer, some sixteen appeals
from dismissals of motions for judgment on the whole record were allowed and
decided by the Supreme and Superior Courts. On the basis of established principles
of law, however, the Lipsky and De W'aele decisions appear to be correct. It is a
familiar rule of law that no appeal may be taken from a judgment, order, or decree
which is not a final disposition of the matter in controversy unless appeal is expressly provided for by statute. American Trust Company v. Kaufman, 279 Pa. 230,
123 A. 785 (1924)- Coleman v. Huffman, 348 Pa. 580 (1944) 36 A. 2d 724.
A judgment is not final unless, upon its affirmance, nothing remains but to execute
it.National Transit Company and J. C. McDowell v. United States Pipe Line Company, 180 Pa. 224, 36 A. 724 (1897). Clearly the dismissal of a motion for judgment on the whole record is not a final judgment, since a new trial will automatically
ensue. The decision is in accord also with the principle of statutory construction that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Act of May
28, 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. IV, §58, 46 P. S. 558 (Statutory Construction Act);
March v. Philadelphia and West Chester Traction Company, 285 Pa. 413, 415,
132 A. 355 (1926). Moreover, the decision is consistent with the court's interpretation of the similarly worded "Judgment N. 0. V. Act" in Sloan v. Miller, 275
Pa. 452, 455, 119 A. 556 (1923).
However correct the DeWaele v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company decision may be, it leaves an anomalous situation in the law. Where a party's point
for binding instructions is reserved or declined and a verdict against him is found,
he may move the court for judgment non obstante veredicto, and he has a right of
appeal from an adverse decision, whether it takes the form of a judgment for the
other party or an order for new trial. Yet that same party, if the jury should happen
to disagree, although he may move for judgment on the whole record and appeal
if the court enters judgment for his opponent, has no right of appeal if the court
refuses to enter a judgment and thus allows a new trial to take place. This inconsistency arises from the differences in the provisions of the statutes involved, and
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the correction of it is not a matter for the court but for the legislature. The "Judgment N.O.V. Act," enacted in 1905, made express provision foi either party to
appeal from a judgment entered against him on motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto but made no reference to a right of appeal from an order for a new trial.
The Act of 1911, which was phrased in language very similar to that of the "Judgment N.O.V. Act," also made provision for appeal from a judgment entered on
motion for judgment on the whole record after disagreement of the jury and did
not refer to appeal from a refusal to enter any judgment. In 1923 the Supreme
Court ruled that no appeal could be taken from an award of a new trial on motion
for judgment n.o.v. under the Act of 1905, the court's decision being based on
much the same grounds as underlie the Lipsky and De Waele decisions. Sloan v.
Miller, cit. supra. The legislature created such right to appeal by amending the Act
of 1905 at the 1925 session. The legislature did not at that time make, and has not
subsequently made, any change in the Act of 1911.
An amendment of the Act of 1911 seems to be in order. The wording of the
Act of 1905 and the Act of 1911 are almost identical, the only differences being
that the first refers to a motion "for judgment non obstance veredicto upon the
whole record," while the second speaks of a motion "for judgment in his favor upon
the whole record" and applies to the situation where "the jury have disagreed."
Both statutes were obviously designed with the same purpose, to permit a party who
was entitled to a directed verdict at the trial to gain substantially the same benefit
after trial. Bond v. PennsylvaniaRailroadCompany, 218 Pa. 34, 66 A. 983 (1907)
(judgment n.o.v.); Derrick v. Harwood Electric Company, 268 Pa. 136, 111 A.
48 (1920) (judgment on the whole record.) The question for determination on
each motion is the same: should the court have given binding instructions for the
moving party at the trial? O'Gara v. PhiladelphiaElectric Company, 22 District
Rep. 304 (1913), affirmed on other grounds in 244 Pa. 156 (1914). That the
jury have failed to agree should make no difference, since it is the contention of
the moving party that there was no issue to go to the jury, that his right to judgment was clear as a matter of law at the close of the evidence. If he has a right to
appeal from an adverse determination of this question on motion for judgment
n.o.v., it would seem that he should have the same right where he has moved for
judgment on the whole record after disagreement of the jury. It appears to the
writer that legislative action to bring the Act of 1911 into conformity with the
amended "Judgment N.O.V. Act" is highly desirable.
D. Fenton Adams
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CRIMINAL LAW-JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF THE CORPUS DELICTI: The definition of the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania has been a source of confusion and misunderstanding. Certainly to a great number of law students, and
perhaps some practicing attorneys, the term 'corpus delicti' in relation to homicide
cases has meant the corpse of a murdered man, and nothing else. Support for this
view might be drawn from the definition found in Black, Law Dictionary 443 (3rd
Ed. 1933), where the corpus delicti is defined as:
"The body of a crime. The body (material substance) upon which a
crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man, the charred
remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, the substance or
foundation of a crime; the substantial fact that a crime has been committed."
Black cites numerous authorities for this definition but no Pennsylvania cases.
An investigation of decisions fails to disclose any case in which the corpus delicti
is defined as 'the body of a crime'. It appears that this state has used the term
wholly in the derivative sense, and further, when used in this connection the courts
of our state have not been consistent.
The most recent pronouncement of the definition of the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania was made by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Haley, 359 Pa. 477,
A. 2d - (1948), a case involving a homicide. There the court establishes this
state as being among a decided minority' of the states which, in defining the corpus
delicti in a homicide case, require as an essential element the proof of the agency
of the accused. In making its decision the court reiterated the definition announced
in Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 A. 611 (1927), where the court said:
"Corpus delicti consists of a criminal act, a resulting death, and the
agency of the accused in its commission. It must appear that the deceased
died from the effects of a wound unlawfully inflicted by the person
charged. See Wharton on Homicide, 3d. ed.,'p. 897 ........
The majority of the states define the corpus delicti as consisting of two elements: (1) the criminal act, i.e. that an act was done under circumstances pointing
to a crime, and (2) the existence of a result forming the basis of the charge, i.e.,
the death of someone in a homicide charge, or the fact that a house burned down
in an arson charge, etc. But it is to be noted from the definition of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court quoted above that this state requires three elements: ( 1 ) the criminal
act, (2) the resulting death in a homicide, and (3) the agency of the accused, i.e.,
that the person on trial was the responsible party, or one of the responsible parties.
It is the wisdom of the inclusion of the third element that prompts this note.
The facts in the Haley case were undisputed. The defendant observed the deceased, in the company of a hostile crowd, about to strike the brother of the defendant, and thereupon, in an attempt to hold off the crowd, stabbed deceased in
the chest. A hemorrhage developed and an operation failed to save his life. There
1 23 Corpus Juris Secundurn §916 (1940).
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was no autopsy performed and the only contention of the defendant was that the
death did not result from the criminal act. Thus the issue in the case was not the
criminal act, nor the fact of death, nor the agency of the accused, but was one of
causal connection alone. Under these circumstances whether or not the definition
of the corpus delicti as announced by the court contained the element of the agency
of the accused was immaterial, since the agency was clearly shown and was undisputed.
In Commonwealth v. Scovern, supra, the issue in the case was the sanity of the
defendant, and the court by way of dicta announced the definition of the corpus
delicti which was later relied upon in the Haley case.
Thus in both the Scovern and the Haley cases, the definition of the corpus
delicti was merely dicta. But where an accurate definition of the corpus delicti is
essential to a proper decision, the use of the third element in the Pennsylvania
definition, i.e., the agency of the accused, causes some poor results.
The authority relied upon in the Scovern case, and the source of the Pennsylvania definition of the corpus delicti, is Wharton, Homicide 897 (3rd ed. 1907).
But in the same volume and on the preceding page the author says:
"Before presumptive evidence, tending to connect the defendant with
the crime, can be invoked, the corpus delicti must be established beyond
reasonable doubt."
In a great number of homicide cases the only type of evidence available to
show the connection of the defendant with the crime (the agency of the accused)
is presumptive evidence. And if the agency of the accused is an essential element
of the corpus delicti as is asserted, then we have the incongruous result of requiring
proof of the corpus delicti, i.e., (1) the criminal act, (2) the resulting death, and
(3) the agency of the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt, before evidence showing
(3) the agency of the accused can be admitted. Such a result'is certainly undesirable.
The inclusion of the agency of the accused as a requisite for the proof of the
corpus delicti in a homicide case will produce another undesirable result. It is well
established that there are three elements to the charge of criminal homicide and,
if these are established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth's case is
jroved. These elements are, (1) the death, or the result, (2) the criminal act, and
(3) that the defendant is the responsible party.' Thus if the agency of the accused
is an element of the corpus delicti, when the corpus delicti is proved, there is nothing more to be shown, for it would be synonymous with the whole of the charge.
There would then, of course, be no necessity for the admission of further evidence
of any type, for the Commonwealth would have met its burden. Commenting upon
this situation, Wigmore, 4 in discussing the view that would include the agency of
the accused as an element of the corpus delicti, says:
2

Ibid.

8 Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A. 2nd 401 (1940).
4 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2072 (3rd ed. (1940).
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"A third view, indeed, too absurd to be argued with, has occasionally
been advanced, at least by counsel, namely, that the 'corpus delicti' includes the third element also, i.e., the accused's identity or agency as the
criminal. By this view the term 'corpus delicti' would be synonomous
with the whole of the charge, and the rule (that the corpus delicti must
be proven before the admission into evidence of a confession of the accused) would require that the whole be evidenced independently of the
confession which would be absurd." (Parenthetical matter supplied.)
This brings up the question as to whether or not the courts of Pennsylvania
would adhere to the definition of the corpus delicti announced in the Haley case
when the question in the case is whether the corpus delicti has been established before allowing the admission of the confession of the accused into evidence. A review of the cases indicates that it would not.
It is a well established rule of evidence in this state that the corpus delicti must
be proved before the confession of the accused will be admitted., In Commonwealth
v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128 A. 87 (1925), the court explained the purpose of
the rule as being to avoid the injustice of a conviction when no crime exists. Thus
it is essential that the crime be shown by sufficient evidence, and this is done by
showing (1) the fact of the death, and (2) that the death resulted under circumstances pointing to the commission of a crime. "In this manner," the court said,
"the corpus delicti is shown." The court then cited Gray v. Commonwealth, 101
Pa. 380 (1882), in reiterating the general rule to the effect that when the fact
that a crime has been committed by someone is shown, the confession will be received into evidence, to show the agency of the accused. In this connection the
Court did not include the agency of the accused as an element of the corpus delicti.
In Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A. 2d 401 (1940), the question
was whether the lower court was correct in admitting the defendant's confession
to a homicide into evidence, before the corpus delicti had been established. The
defendant contended that the Commonwealth had to prove (1) the death of the
person, and (2) somebody's criminality, and (3) the agency of the accused, as the
corpus delicti, before his confession should have been admitted. It is to be observed
that the defendant argued for such a definition of the corpus delicti as was laid
down by the Haley case. But the court here disposed of his argument saying:
"Thus, wherever, as here, the Commonwealth, in a homicide case, has
established that the person for whose death the prosecution was instituted
is in fact dead and that the death occurred under circumstances indicating
that it was criminally caused by someone, the rule is satisfied and admissions or confessions of the accused may then always be received as proof
of the guilty agent ..... "
Again the agency of the accused is not included as an element of the corpus
delicti.
5 Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882) ; Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128
A. 87 (1925); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A. 2d 710 (1943).
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The rule is repeated in the comparatively recent case involving homicide, of
Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A. 2d 155 (1943). There the court
said:
"The question .... is not whether defendant committed the murder,
but whether the evidence should go to the jury ......
to determine that
the child was dead and that it came to its death by felonious act; in other
words, that there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to go to the
jury."
The most comprehensive opinion on the subject was handed down by Judge
Keller in the case of Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 282 A. 2d 710
(1942). This case did not involve a homicide, but was concerned with the defendant's guilt to the charge of possessing and selling opium. The defendant contended that his admissions to police officers could not be admitted into evidence
until after the corpus delicti had been proved, and that the agency of the accused
had not been proved before the confessions made by the defendant had been admitted into the evidence. The court quoted extensively from Wigmore, 6 and the
Turza and Gardnercases, supra, and concluded by holding to the effect that although
the agency of the defendant was an essential and necessary element of the offenses
charged in the indictmoent, it was not an element or constituent of the corpus delicti.
In conclusion it appears that Pennsylvania continues to give lip service to the
definition of the corpus delicti as announced in the Haley case, i.e., that it consists
of three elements, namely, (1) a criminal act, (2) a resulting death, and (3) the
agency of the accused in its commission. However, since in each instance that this
definition was used it was employed as dicta, it appears that the true rule which
will be followed by the courts of this state, when the corpus delicti is the matter in
issue, is that of the majority of states, i.e., that the corpus delicti consists of ( 1) the
criminal act, and (2) the resulting death. It is the "loose usage" of the definition
of the corpus delicti by the courts that causes them to be constantly plagued with
cases where counsel for the defendant contend that the agency of the accused was
not shown and thus the corpus delicti was not proved, so that admissions or confessions of the defendant could not therefore be admitted against him. Such an argument can be completely eliminated by strict adherence to the definition of corpus
delictiwhich does not include the agency of the accused.
Joseph H. Jones, Jr.
6 Supra, note 4.
7 State v. Joy, 315 Mo. 7, 285 S. W. 489 (1926), where Justice Blair in a concurring opinion
said that the agency of the accused was not an element of the corpus delicti and described statements
of the courts to the contrary as "loose expressions", and suggested that the inclusion of the criminal
agency of the person on trial as an element of the corpus delicti has -'doubtless crept into the decisions in those cases where it happened .o be necessary to show the criminal agency of the accused
in order to establish the very fact of the crime."
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CONFLICTS OF LAWS-EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT ORDER-"THE NEW DOCTRINE OF HALF-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT": In June of 1948, the Supreme
Court of the United States decided two companion cases that may have a profound
effect on the volume of migratory divorces. In Estin v. Estin' and Kreiger v. Kreiger2
it was held that a support order given to a wife in one state will survive an absolute
divorce based on constructive service granted the husband in another state. At first
glance the proposition appears sound and the basic reasoning behind it is in accord
with sound legal logic. But an examination of the cases reveals an unfortunate
application of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution in such
a manner as to operate as a denial of due process of law. In those states where an
absolute divorce ends the duty of the husband to support the wife it also ends the
right of the wife to such support, but in certain other states the right of support
continues after divorce.3 The decisions in the principal cases are from New York,
a jurisdiction which does not recognize the wife's right to support after the husband
has secured an absolute divorce. 4 The net result of the cases is to give support to
a wife whom the husband is not legally required to support. The husband finds
himself in this extraordinary situation because he obtained his divorce in a foreign
jurisdiction and the practical result may well be a slowing down of the migratory
divorce rate.
Since both cases involve important considerations under the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution5 as well as important principles of domestic relations and conflicts of laws, the factual backgrounds become extremely important:
In the Estin case, the wife had been awarded $180 monthly for her maintenance
and support in a separation proceeding brought by her in New York. Subsequently,
the husband obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada based on constructive service
but the decree said nothing on the issue of alimony. Thereupon the wife sued in
New York for the arrears due on the support order, since the husband had stopped
payment upon obtaining his divorce. The New York court following the rule of
Williams v. North Carolina6, and Esenwein v. Pennsylvania7, found in accord with
the Nevada Court that Mr. Estin was a bonafide resident of Nevada and that his divorce was therefore entitled to full faith and credit. However, judgment was given
for the wife on the theory that the Nevada Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the
New York support order. The facts of the Kreiger case are very much the same
except that the previous support order included a provision for the support of children. The following discussion does not dwell on the latter aspect because the status
1 -U.

S. -,68
S. Ct. 1213, 2 - U.S.-' 68 S. Ct. 1221,-

L. Ed.-, (1948).

L. Ed.-, (1948).
8 27 Corpus Juris Secundum § 229.
4 Davies v. Davies, 62 N. Y. S. 2nd. 790, (1946).
5 Estin v. Estin, note I supra, at 1215 n.
6 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273, (1942)
S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. ED, 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366, (1945).
7 325 U. S. 279, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1273, (1945).
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of New York law is such that children are entitled to support from the father in any
event and he is legally bound to support them after he obtains a divorces .
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion terms this decision as a "Solomonlike conclusion" that the Nevada decree is half good and half bad under the full
faith and credit clause9. Absurd as this may sound, it would be a perfectly logical
result in any state where the wife's right to support is not terminated by divorce.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, the court employed the following
steps in reaching its conclusion:
First: The New York separation judgment, granting the wife permanent alimony, was a "property interest" of the wife. Since this is an intangible, jurisdiction over it could only be exerted through control of the
physical being, i.e., the wife. The latter was served by publication and any
attempt by the court to adjudicate her rights in saia "property interest'
would be void.1"
Second: The full faith and credit clause (which requires a foreign divorce based on constuctive service and valid domicile to be given the same
effect as a domestic divorce") is not violated here because that clause demands full faith and credit only for that part of the foreign judgment
which is based on valid jurisdiction.
Third: Since the Nevada court had no jurisdiction to litigate the wife's
riht in her support order and since the Nevada divorce is an attempt by
Nkvada to restrain the wife from asserting her claim,' 2 it is an attempt
to exercise jurisdiction in personam over a person not before the court.
Hence it is not entitled to full faith and credit."
Fourth: The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisibleto give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and
to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It accommodates the interest
of both Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by restricting each
state to matters of its dominant concern.
Note that the foregoing reasoning is based on the assumption that the Nevada
decree was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Nevada Court to litigate rights
over which it had no jurisdiction. The facts as stated in the beginning of the majority
opinion are, "The Nevada decree made no provision for alimony, although the
Nevada court had been advised of the New York court decree." Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out that the Nevada decree did not purport to rule on the survival
of the New York support order. The former merely established a change in status
and it was for New York to determine the effect of that changed status. If New
8 New York Civil Practice Act, Art. 68, § 1155 & 1170, 1920. Thompson's Laws of New York,
1939, Part II, pps. 1771 & 1773.
9 Estin v. Estin, Op. cit., at 1221.
10

Bassett v. Bassett, 323 U. S. 718, 89 L. Ed. 577, 65 S. Ct. 47, 141 F. 2nd. 954, 51 F. S. 545,

(1944).
11 Note 6, supra.
12

Estin v. Estin, Op. cit., at 1219.

Is Hansburg v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741, (1940).
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York law is to the effect that divorce put an end to a separate maintenance decree,
then the support order would have been terminated by the consequences of a change
in status, the change coming as a result of the Nevada decree but the consequences
stemming from New York law.' 4
An examination of previous New York cases and statutes reveals without a
shadow of doubt that an absolude divorce obtained by the husband terminates the
duty to support the wife. The court admits that counsel for the husband presented a
detailed analysis of New York law to show that the New York courts have no power
either by statute or common law to compel a man to support his ex-wife, that alimony is-payable only so long as the relation of husband and wife exists, and that
in New York a support order does not survive divorce. All this is completely negatived by the statement," ... that the highest court in New York has held in this case
that a support order can survive divorce and that this one has survived petitioner's
divorce."'Ir Then the United States Supreme Court points out that such a conclusion
is binding on them except so far as it conflicts with the full faith and credit clause.
It is quite true that the Feaeral Supreme Court in exercising appellate jurisdiction
over a case arising from the highest court of a state involving state matters, Where
the revisory powers are limited to Constitutional questions, knows as law what
was so known to the state court."0 It has even been held that a federal court must
follow the latest dicta of the highest court of the state17 but not that of the lower
courts. 8 This is the same familiar rule that appears in federal courts when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Because of this well-reasoned rule, the
Supreme Court is bound by the New York Court's detemination in this very case
that an ex-parte divorce does not terminate a prior support order.
The amazing result of the decision is not at all supported by prior New York
law. The Civil Practice Act 19 is very explicit in reciting that the court must make
provision for the support of the wife when she is the one who obtains the divorce.
But it makes no provision at all for her right to support when the husband secures
the divorce. Further, it provides for a mandatory support order for children, regardless of who gets the divorce, thus strengthening the exclusion of the wife's right
to support when the husband gets the divorce. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Al20
terius.
In Davies v. Davies it was held that an order requiring a person to contribute to
the support of one with whose support he is not chargeable, such as a divorced wife,
is void. This was a 1946 case decided in the Domestic Relations Court of New York
14 Estin v. Estin, Op. cit., at 1219:

1r Ibid, at 1216.
Is Goodrich, CONFLICTS OF LAWS (Hornbook), p. 195: See also 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct.
1015, 88 L.Ed. 1246, (1944).
17 279 U. S.717,80 L.Ed. 1002, 56 S.Ct. 592, 138 A.L.R. 136, (1929).
18 107 F. 2nd. 738, 25 F. S. 35, 137 A.L. R. 793, (1939).
19 Note 8,supra.
20 Co. Litt. 210 a: See also 98 Mass. 29, (1867), and 5 Watts (Pa.) 156, (1836).
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City. The basis of a woman's right to support by a man is the conventional relationship of husband and wife and when such a relation does not exist the Domestic Re21
lations Court has no power to order such support.
Hoops v. Hoops22 and Bogert v. Watts2 5 are examples of when a wife is entitled to support in New York after an absolute divorce, that situation arising only
when the wife is the libellant in the divorce action.
The fundamenal proposition underlying the cases which provoked this article
is whether or not the New York court must give the same effect to a foreign exparte divorce as they would give to a domestic ex-parte divorce. Since the U. S.
Supreme Court adopts the view that it is the policy of New York, as declared in the
instant case, to refuse to set aside a prior support order after any ex-parte divorce,
the New York court is free to give the same effect to a foreign as they would a
domestic ex-parte divorce. The only quarrel with this result is that New York law
is strictly to the contrary. Mr. Justice Jackson, a New York attorney for many years,
points this out in his dissent and Mr. Justice Frankfurter would remand the cases
for clarification by the New York court. His point in doing this is that the state court
opinion does not make entirely clear the exact status of the New York law. Such
an ambiguity should not be permitted to stand as a barrier to a determination of the
24
validity of state action under the Federal Constitution.
The suggestion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter to remand the case would have been
the wisest course here. Even though the court felt bound to honor the state's latest
interpretation of its own law, would it not be better justice for the husband to require the state court to reconsider its action in flying in the face of the known law?
If the highest court in the state is free to interpret the law in firm contradiction of
the existing statutory law, the citizen is left without recourse. Is it due process of
law to allow the court to decide that the law is not what it has been unequivocally declared to be? Since the Supreme Court of the United States is powerless to help the
citizen in such a case by overruling the interpretation as given by the state court, it
should consider the possibilities of remanding the case for an express declaration
by the state court that the law is not as written. If the state court still felt inclined
to baldly assert itself in spite of conscience, the citizen would be forced to surrender
his rights or vacate the jurisdiction in favor of a more agreeable legal climate.
In light of these decisions, in spite of the fact that it is well settled in Pennsylvania that an absolute divorce terminates a separate maintenance decree,2 s the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would be free to refuse to set aside a prior support
order when the husband secured a divorce. This determination, when appealed to
21 Domestic Relations Court Act for the City of New York, Laws 1933 Ch. 482, § 91; Thomp.
son's Laws of New York, 1939, Part II, p. 1571.
22 292 N. Y. 428, 42 N. Y. S. 2nd. 635, 58 N. Y. S. 2nd. 151, (1943).
28 32 N. Y. S. 2nd. 750, (1942).
24 Minn. v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S, 551, 60 S. Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920, (1940).
25 Esenwein v. Comm., note 7, supra.
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the United States Supreme Court, would be binding as the latest interpretation of
Pennsylvania law, even though in disregard of many previous cases28 as well as the
Divorce Law.27 Historically, alimony has never been an incident of absolute divorce
in Pennsylvania as a matter of right except from 1854-1895. From the latter year
discretion of the court, and since
until 1925 it was a right solely contingent upon the
28
then it has not existed except in case of insanity.
It is indeed a presumption based on ignorance to assume that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would make such a decisicn. And yet that is exactly what the New
York Court has done in the Estin and Kreiger cases. They have literally wiped out
the statutes, overruled the cases, and mocked the rights of the citizens who placed
them in a judicial position. If they are to be permitted to do this, the words of
Charles Dickens, spoken through the mouth of Mr. Bumble' become exceedingly
important, "If the law supposes that, the law is a ass, a idiot. "29
Before closing, it may be well to point out that if the ex-Mrs. Estin had elected
to sue on her support order in any other state than New York, the forum would
have been compelled to give judgment for the husband on the ground that New
York law gives the wife no right to support when the husband obtains an absolute
divorce. Every other state in the union would be forced to interpret New York
law as it actually is but when the New York court makes an interpretation it is free
to act as it sees fit. The resulting clash between the Constitution of the United States,
New York's public policy on providing support for wives, Nevada's divorce decree,
and the husband's right not to have to support a divorced wife, finds New York's
public policy coming out on top. From the legal point of view, it would seem that
it is for the legislature to effect such drastic changes in the law and until that is done
it should be the province of the courts to interpret the law as it is written.
Guy B. Mayo
26 Moore v. Moore, 192 Pa. 193. (1899):
136, (1944).

17 D. & C. (Pa.)

236, (1933): 156 Pa. Superior

27 Act of May 2, 1929 PL 1237: 23 P.S. I et seq.
28 Myers v. Myers, 17 D. & C. (Pa.) 236, Clinton County, (1933).
29 Charles Dickens; OLIVER TWIST, Ch. 51.

